were occurring. In response, the Illinois Commission of Savings and Loan Associations developed the first anti-redlining policy in the nation. Then, Chicago City Council passed an ordinance requiring that banks that held municipal deposits disclose their loan data by zip code.
This ordinance later became a model for federal legislation: Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975 (Mariano, 2003) .
In the mid-1970s, ACORN, the Center for Community Change, and other community organizations joined the fight against redlining. The first national victory from this flurry of antiredlining organizing was passage of the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975 sponsored by Wisconsin Senator William Proxmire. Although HMDA did not require the banks to disclose all the data community organizations were asking for (such as race and gender of applicants), it did require all FDIC insured commercial banks and savings and loans with assets of $10 million to disclose annually the geographic distribution of mortgage across urban areas (Mariano, 2003) . After two more years of intensive organizing, community groups joined Civil Rights organizations, numerous City Mayors, and traditional Washington based public interest groups to push Congress to pass the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977 (Immergluck, 2004) .
Considering that both the HMDA and CRA bills were opposed by the banking lobby and all four banking regulatory agencies (who already felt like they had the authority to monitor the Community Reinvestment Act 7 flow of credit) (Immergluck, 2004) , these two victories were watershed accomplishments.
Senator Proxmire himself gave direct credit to the community organizations in stating "this disclosure bill would never have become a law but for the research and local organizing activity undertaken by NPA" (Mariano, 2003) . The literature on the grassroots activities providing the impetus for the passage of the CRA and HMDA offers excellent case studies of community organizing and successful policy practice.
Community Organizations as Enforcers of CRA Regulations
The CRA was written in a way that placed the onus for enforcement on the community rather than regulators. There were no clear-cut guidelines in the law to measure whether a bank was meeting its credit obligations in a community. There were no explicit penalties or punishments for banks that earned unsatisfactory CRA ratings. If a bank received a negative rating, the regulatory agency retained the right to approve the bank's application for a merger or opening of a branch. Regulatory agencies were originally against passing the CRA (Immergluck, 2004) and had historically been biased in favor of banks and against community organizations.
The CRA allowed community organizations to challenge a bank's application for expansion, but if a community organization wanted to successfully challenge a bank, organizers had to conduct excellent research, mobilize numerous affected constituents, and make compelling arguments to convince reluctant regulators. When a regulator ascribed credibility to a challenge, regulators often instructed banks and community organizations to reach agreement (Immergluck, 2004) .
The onus was on the community organizations to ensure that the spirit of the legislation was honored.
Further Changes to the CRA and the Impact of the CRA over the Years
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During the first eight years of the CRA through 1985, only eight out of 40,000 applications for expansion were denied (Immergluck, 2004) . In 1989 community organizations won several significant amendments to HMDA and the CRA. With the 1989 Financial Institutions Reform Recovery and Enforcement Act (the Savings and Loan Bail-Out Bill), regulators were required to publicly disclose an institution's ratings and performance evaluations (Immergluck, 2004) . In 1989, the first bank was denied an application for merger under the CRA grounds (Barr, 2005) . In 1995, the Clinton Administration issued directives to revise CRA regulations to make them more performance based, to make the review process more consistent, and to make compliance less burdensome for banks (Braunstein, 2008; Ludwig, Kamihachi, & Toh, 2009 ). Subsequently, more denials of banks' request to expand their operations occurred.
Finally, 18 years after enactment of the CRA law, real changes in lending followed (Ludwig, et al., 2009) . Voluntary pledges from banks to increase lending to low income communities increased (Ludwig et al., 2009; Schwartz, 2006) . Studies at Harvard University requested by the US Department of Treasury credits the CRA with "nearly $620 billion in home mortgage, small business, and community development loans to low and moderate income borrowers and communities" (Barr, 2005) . The National Community Reinvestment Coalition, an organization founded in 1990 to monitor agreements between community organizations and financial institutions, estimates that ". . . lenders and community organizations have signed CRA agreements totaling more than $6 trillion in reinvestment dollars" (2010, p. 3) . From 1993 to 1999, financing of new homes by CRA obligated lenders increased by 93.7% and refinancing increased by 39.1% (Litan et al., 2001) . From 1996 to 2006, the annual dollar amount of loans for community development increased by 319 percent from $17.7 billion to $56.6 billion (Taylor, 2008) . Additionally, the CRA reduced disparities in home ownership between whites and minorities (Schwartz, 2006; Segal & Sullivan, 1998) . From 1993 to 1999, the number of home purchase loans made to Hispanics increased 121.4%; to Native Americans, 118.9%; to African Americans, 91.0%; to Asians, 70.1%, and to whites, 33.5% (Barr, 2005) . The Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard (2002) estimates that for the period 1993-2000, 336,000 fewer home purchases would have been made to low income borrowers and communities were it not for the CRA. Moreover, CRA-covered entities, operating in their assessment areas, were the largest originators of low cost loans to low income persons (Avery, Courchane, & Zorn, 2008; California Reinvestment Coalition et al., 2009; Joint Center for Housing Studies, 2002; Ludwig et al., 2009 ).
In addition to mortgage loans, CRA covered institutions also report on small business loans made to those in low income areas. From 1997 to 2003, small business loans doubled to firms with revenues under $1 million (Barr, 2005) . The CRA increased access to credit by 12-15% in low income communities, increasing payrolls and reducing bankruptcies (Zinman, 2002) .
In addition to increasing lending in minority communities, under the CRA, banks are given credit for innovations in banking. Because of the CRA, banks have invested in locally based Community Development Corporations partnering with these Institutions to experiment with new market opportunities allowing more flexible underwriting and specialized servicing techniques along with credit counseling (Kroszner, 2008) . Barr (2008) concludes that the CRA has instigated innovations by banks in lending to low income communities as well as induced banks to invest in Community Development Financial Institutions that lend to low income persons and offer financial education.
Low Default Rates on Loans by CRA Regulated Banks
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The proximal cause of the insolvency in the banking system was occasioned by the widespread default on subprime mortgages. The CRA was not heavily involved in the subprime loan sector. While the CRA did increase mortgages for low income people, only 6% of the subprime loans originated during the 2005-2006 period were made by CRA covered institutions, while 66% of subprime loans were made by non-bank entities (Bernanke, 2007; Bhutta & Canner, 2009; . The loans made by CRA covered institutions to low income communities had an equivalent default rate to loans made to more affluent individuals (Essene & Apgar, 2008; Kroszner, 2008; Ludwig et al., 2009) . Unlike the eventually unprofitable subprime loans, CRA covered institutional loans to poor people were profitable (Barr, 2008; Board of Governors at the Federal Reserve, 2000; Gramlich, 2007) .
A number of studies have specifically teased apart whether high default rates are foreclosure on the financial product rather than characteristics of the borrower. Subprime loans place too great a burden on low income borrowers (Quercia & Ratcliffe, 2009) . Additionally, the delinquency rates on subprime loans are high regardless of neighborhood income (Kroszner, 2008) .
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Consistent with the conclusion that characteristics of the loan rather than characteristics of the borrower contributes to high default rates, there is a study by the Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco (Canner & Bhutta, 2008; Laderman & Reid, 2008) . The study found that CRAcovered lenders making loans in their assessment areas were half as likely to enter foreclosure as high-interest rate loans originated by independent mortgage companies (which were not covered by the CRA). Similar results were obtained in a study from Ohio (Coulton, Chan, Schram, & Mikelbank, 2008) . A review of the default rates by low income people participating in mortgage programs through Community Development Corporations also illustrates that poor people do pay back their loans when the terms of the loans are fair (Abromowitz & Ratcliffe, 2010 ).
Taylor (2008) speculates on the reasons why CRA-obligated lenders did not make the subprime loans (which were more likely to default). He suggests that the fact that the CRA regulators gave banks credit for preparing borrowers for home loans by providing quality homeownership counseling may have precluded loans with high interest rates and other expensive features. Additionally, because CRA-obligated loans were not sold to others, the CRA originator had a big stake in ensuring that the loan would be repaid (Stein, 2008) . Debt has increased vitiating the national appetite for social programs (Baker, 2010; Berenbaum, 2009; Johnson & Kwak, 2010) . National attention is now focused on reforming the financial system. In order to be active participants in this legislative process, social workers need to Community Reinvestment Act 12 identify the factors leading to the collapse of the financial sector so that they can advocate for changes in the statutes that remedy the veridical causes of the 2008 financial collapse.
The Housing Bubble's Role in the Financial Collapse
Robert Shiller (2008) argues that the cause of the crisis was "irrational exuberance" in the housing market. Indeed, housing prices rose 70% in the decade from 1998 to 2008 whereas rents rose only 35%. Some economists suggest the housing bubble (artificially high prices of homes) was created by the rise in the money supply attributable to very low interest rates from Federal
Reserve under Alan Greenspan. Another source for an increasing money supply in investment markets was the Chinese. The Chinese had accumulated American dollars as a result of the long-standing trade imbalance. The Chinese invested their accumulated dollars in American financial institutions, flooding them with dollars needing to be invested (Wessel, 2009 ). This contributed an additional inflationary factor. In 2004, the Securities and Exchange Commission further increased the money supply in the investment arena by increasing the leverage ratio for investment banks from 12-to-1 to 30-to-1. Thus, investment banks were making more loans with borrowed money, adding to the money supply, but increasing risk to the system (McArdle, 2009) . Rather than all these increases in money (relative to available goods) leading to general inflation, a housing bubble ensued (Shiller, 2008) .
Financial institutions came to overvalue the housing assets. No one believed that the bubble could burst, that is, that suddenly the price of houses could collapse. The wide-spread practice of asset-based lending ensued. With conventional loans, banks make profits on the interest paid by the borrower. The value of the loan to the bank is based on the borrower's ability to repay the loan. The bank has a stake in the repayment of the principle and the interest by the borrower. With asset-based lending, the banks view their profits as deriving from the Community Reinvestment Act 13 value of the collateral, i.e., the value of the property. If the borrower defaults, the property, whose value is inflating, can be resold at a higher value than the original loan. The business model is to earn a profit on the rising value of the asset (Brescia, 2008b; Schwartz, 2006) .
Changes in Mortgage Industry Facilitating the Rise in Subprime Products
The world of home finance has bifurcated. Mortgage companies have encroached on the territory of banks and Savings and Loans (thrifts) in financing home-ownership. While in 1980, banks and thrifts originated more than 70% of mortgages; by 1997, mortgage companies were initiating 56% of mortgages (Immergluck, 2004; Schwartz, 2006) . In terms of the mortgage products they offer, banks and mortgage companies (represented by brokers) differ. Brokers initiated 50% of subprime loans but only 28% of prime loans (Barr, 2008; Bhutta & Canner, 2009; Brescia, 2008b) . In terms of loans to low income individuals or individuals in low income areas, 50% percent of subprime loans were made by brokers working for mortgage companies, (entities not covered by the CRA). Banks tended to offer prime rate loans (Canner & Bhutta, 2008; Essene & Apgar, 2008; Gramlich, 2007; Ludwig et al., 2009 ). Brokers and banks also differ in terms of who initiates the sales of the loan. Most subprime loans were initiated by lenders rather than borrowers, whereas the banks wait for the customers to approach them (Immergluck, 2004; Kim-Sung & Hermanson, 2003) .
There were other differences between traditional banks and brokers as well. Brokers were not regulated by any of the laws regulating traditional banks (Essene & Apgar, 2008; Immergluck, 2004; Immergluck & Smith, 2005) . Brokers quickly sold the loans they originated to secondary financial institutions, whereas banks were more likely to retain the loans they originated (Bagley, 2004; Kiff & Mills, 2007; Schwartz, 2006) .
Securitization Facilitates the Rise in Subprime Lending
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The bundling of mortgages and selling the bundles to others is called securitization. This is a recent financial innovation. During Clinton's presidency, the Banking Act of 1933 (GlassSteagall) was repealed by the Financial Modernization Act of 1999 (Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
This allowed for banks to conduct both investment and depository banking, thereby allowing banks to bundle and sell mortgages.
Securitization further fueled the subprime market activity, because the money received by brokers for the mortgages could be used to make new loans. The practice of securitization of mortgages had become widespread before the 2008 collapse. By 2006, approximately 80% of the $600 billion in mortgages were securitized (Avery et al., 2008; Bair, 2007; Ludwig et al., 2009 ).
Buyers of securities (bundled mortgages) were reassured by the Triple-A ratings given to them by rating agencies. Rating agencies had a strong incentive to overvalue the securities because they were paid for their ratings by the sellers of these products who could go to other rating agencies for alternative ratings (Berenbaum, 2009) . Additionally, buyers of securities also believed in asset-based lending, assuming that the responsible managing-agents of these securities could foreclose on the property and resell the property to recapture the investment capital, should a borrower be unable to pay. Back at the point of origin of the loans, where brokers spoke with new homebuyers, borrowers were reassured that they could refinance their homes should adjustable rate mortgages become too large (Brescia 2008b; Stein, 2008) . All assumed that the value of homes would increase or at least remain stable (Berenbaum, 2009 ).
With respect to the impact on the financial sector of the economy, securitization distributed the risk of a local real estate collapse across geographic regions and increased the flow of money (Avery et al., 2008; Bagley, 2004) . However, with banks buying each other's Community Reinvestment Act 15 products, securitization also linked the outcomes of many institutions and investors. If one failed, they all failed (Sorkin, 2009) . Moreover, the practice of securitization introduced new risks of higher rates of foreclosure into the system. Unlike traditional mortgages, where the bank retained the loan and retained the authority to reset the terms of the loan should the borrower experience a financial hardship impairing the ability to make a payment; with securitization, the identity of the actual owner of the mortgage, who might have authority to negotiate, was impossible to trace (Brescia, 2008a; 2008b) . The finding that even when local banks make high interest loans, the mortgages originated by the banks have lower foreclosure rates than those originated by brokers is consistent with this idea (Coulton et al., 2008) .
Reasons for the Development of Subprime Lending
The increase in money supply placed pressure on financial institutions, which were in competition for investment dollars, to make bigger profits on the money invested with them.
Subprime lending offered a way to increase profits on investment dollars. Once bundled into securities, investors could potentially earn high interest rates on their securities. The demand for the securities came from Wall Street investors (who purchased the bulk of subprime loans) hungry for high interest earning products (Mian & Sufi, 2007; Stein, 2008) . According to Alan Greenspan speaking to Jon Meacham and Daniel Gross (2007) "The big demand was not so much on the part of borrowers as it was on the part of the suppliers who were giving loans which really people couldn't afford. We created something which was unsustainable. And it eventually broke. If it weren't for securitization, the subprime loan market would have been very significantly less in size." allowed for banks to vary interest rates based on risk. Thus, interest rates could be high enough to make risky loans profitable (Ludwig et al., 2008; Shiller, 2008) . In 1982, The Alternative Mortgage Transaction Parity Act was passed permitting adjustable mortgage rates. These deregulatory changes allowed for the development of the subprime market.
Subprime loans are characterized by the following: higher interest rates than conventional loans, higher fees and closing costs, penalties for early repayment of loans, high appraisal fees, and initially, seductively low rates of interest followed by later higher interest rates. Additionally, sometimes, the initial payment rates were insufficient to cover the accumulating interest, thereby increasing the amount of principal owed on the loan (Immergluck, 2004) . In subprime loans, taxes and insurance on homes are often not included in the mortgage, thus placing an unexpected expense on the income of the borrowers (Stein, 2008) . Some subprime mortgages also included credit life insurance. This insurance would repay the entire debt given the death or disability of the borrower. However, the cost of the insurance was added to the principal sometimes amounting to 15% of the principal amount of the loan (Bagley, 2004; Immergluck, 2004) . In addition to the original subprime loan, flipping with the same lender, was wide-spread. Flipping is the repeated refinancing of a loan in a short period of time with high fees and prepayment penalties (Barr, 2008) . With the practice of flipping, rather than incrementing a borrower's percentage ownership of their homes, they lost equity in their homes over time (Barr, 2008) .
Much of the subprime lending involved refinancing of homes, rather than financing of new home purchases (Immergluck, 2004; Stein, 2008) . In 1986, the Tax Reform Act was passed. This law allowed people to deduct interest from mortgage payments from income in figuring their tax bill. Interest on credit card debt was not, however, deductable. From the late by lower wages and higher costs of health insurance (Warren & Tyagi, 2003) . Many refinanced their homes to pay off credit cards. Credit card consolidation motivated 58% of subprime refinancing, compared to 25% of prime refinancing (Immergluck, 2004) . Indeed, about a third of refinance money went to pay down credit card debt (Greenspan and Kennedy, 2007 ; U.S.
Department of Housing and Urban Development and U.S. Department of Treasury, 2000). As
real estate agent Dave Simonsen stated, "people used their homes as ATM machines" (Goodman, 2007) .
Growth of Subprime Lending
Subprime lending experienced substantial growth from 2003 to 2006. Whereas only 5% of mortgage originations were subprime in 1994, by 2005 this figure was 20% (Gramlich, 2007) .
From 2003 to 2006, the percentage of all mortgages that were subprime increased from 8% to 20% (Barr, 2008) . In 2006, 20% of mortgages originated were subprime and 25% of total mortgage securitizations were for subprime mortgages (Kornfeld, 2007) . Concomitant with the growth of subprime mortgages, in 2006, homeownership hit a high of 69% (Kiff & Mills, 2007) .
The riskiness of subprime loans was particularly acute after 2006. Little documentation of a borrower's ability to repay occurred. Loans were made for 100% of the value of the property rather than requiring a down-payment (Brescia, 2008b, p. 296; Kornfeld, 2007) . While in 2000, only 2% of loans involved adjustable rate mortgages or mortgage payments for only the interest, in 2006, 39% of mortgages carried these features (Berenbaum, 2009 ).
Subprime loans were eight times more likely to default than prime loans (Immergluck, 2004; Immergluck & Smith, 2005) . Loans made after 2006 were particularly likely to default (Brescia, 2008b, p. 296; Kornfeld, 2007 loans with adjustable rate mortgages were current, 22 percent were 60 or more days delinquent, 16 percent were in foreclosure, and 10 percent were owned by the real estate company (Berenbaum, 2009) . As mentioned previously, since 2006, housing prices declined by 25% (Berenbaum, 2009) . Currently 23% of mortgages are underwater, with borrowers owing more money on their homes than the market value of the home (Pepitone, 2009) .
Subprime lending targeted minorities. While the majority of subprime loans went to white borrowers, minorities were over-represented among subprime borrowers (Stein, 2008) .
The market for white, middle class loans was saturated. Making loans to minorities was a market that was not yet saturated, so minorities were identified as a market for the new subprime products (Brescia, 2008b) . Over 50% of mortgages to African Americans were subprime products and 40% of mortgages to Latinos were subprime products (Avery, 2006) . Examining seven metropolitan areas, 40% of subprime loans were made in predominantly minority neighborhoods, whereas 10% of subprime loans were made in white areas (California Reinvestment Coalition et al., 2009 ).
For minorities, having middle class incomes was not a protection against falling victim to subprime lending. According to a HUD 2000 analysis of lending in five large cities, 39% of refinancing in upper-income black census tracts were subprime products compared to only 18% in lower-income white census tracts (Immergluck, 2004) . Examining results from several studies, Immergluck (2004) concluded that the most important factor explaining the concentration of subprime lending was the homogeneity of minorities in the area. The concentration of racial minorities in an area was more important than income level of the borrower, educational attainment of the borrower, or credit history of the borrower, although older people were more likely to be targeted as well (Berenbaum, 2009; Immergluck, 2004) .
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Ironically, many of those who took out subprime loans could have qualified for prime lending (Berenbaum, 2009) . Brokers initiating loans were given extra compensation for selling mortgages which charged interest rates above the rates to which a borrower's credit score entitled the individual (Gramlich, 2007) Some explanation is needed for why affluent minorities agreed to subprime products.
According to a HUD-Treasury Report, in white communities, there is more competition among prime lenders (banks, thrifts, credit unions) for making loans. Moreover, in communities with greater competition among prime lenders, loan terms are more transparent and more homogenous (Cortes, Wilson, Herbert, & Mahdavi, 2006) . Among African Americans, 64% of mortgages were through a broker, as opposed to 38% of mortgages sold to whites. Whites were more likely to finance their mortgages through a bank or thrift, institutions more often offering prime loans (Brescia, 2008b) .
Fight against predatory/subprime lending. Consumer groups (e.g., AARP, National Consumer Law Center, Consumer Federation of America) did protest predatory lending in minority communities (Immergluck, 2004) . Their activities led to the passage of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA) of 1994. This bill required more disclosure and warnings to consumers taking out high priced loans with exorbitant interest rates. However, lenders found ways around the law. The practice of refinancing and then refinancing again, when Community Reinvestment Act 20 the borrower could not make a payment, enabled lenders to charge large fees for each refinancing while keeping interest rates just below the HOEPA trigger levels (Bagley, 2004; Schwartz, 2006) . Only about 5% of subprime loans were covered by HOEPA according to a study conducted by the Office of Thrift Supervision (Bostic, Engel, McCoy, Pennington-Cross, & Wachter, 2008) . Unfortunately, HOEPA did little to curb the rise of subprime loans, particularly refinancing loans (Immergluck, 2004) .
In 2000, the Clinton administration again demonstrated concern over the growth in subprime lending. The U.S. Department of Treasury and the U.S. Department of Housing and Urban Development produced a report on predatory lending and Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae tightened underwriting criteria for the mortgages they purchased (Schwartz, 2006) . The Justice Department of the Clinton Administration also brought suit against Huntington Mortgage and Fleet Mortgage in 1996 for charging higher upfront fees to minorities (Immergluck, 2004 ).
There were other attempts to fight predatory lending. Various states (California, Georgia, Massachusetts, New York, North Carolina) passed laws against predatory lending. In Chicago, ordinances forbade the city from doing business with predatory lenders. After these state laws were passed, prime lending in minority communities increased, possibly because banks did not have to compete against the aggressive tactics of subprime brokers (Immergluck, 2004) .
However, in 2004, the Office of Controller of the Currency (OCC) interpreted national banking laws as preempting the right of state governments to pass predatory lending legislation. Then, under the Bush administration, the OCC and Office of Thrift Supervision issued injunctions to states with predatory lending laws preventing the enforcement of these laws ending the brief period that offered some protection (Bagley, 2004; Brescia, 2009a; Ding, Quercia, White, 2009; Stein, 2008) .
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The Role of Credit Swap Derivatives in the Financial Collapse
As with the emergence of securitization, Wall Street was developing more complicated financial products. New products, called derivatives emerged. Collectively, the term derivative means that the value of the product is based upon the value of some other more tangible, more easily valued product (e.g., the value of a particular nation's currency; the value of a commodity such as a barrel of oil or bushel of wheat). An argument can be made that the use of computers and sophisticated mathematical models in estimating the value of these derivatives is what has facilitated the rise of these derivatives (Schwartz, 2006) . Truly, Warren Buffett's term for credit default swaps, "financial weapons of mass destruction"
was not an exaggeration (BBC News, 2003) .
Blind Faith in Deregulation's Role in the Financial Collapse
Cassidy ( (which has 600 affiliates distributed across most major cities) win passage of HR 1479.
The current rise in foreclosures has exerted a devastating impact on the lives of low income people. Shelia Bair of the FDIC has argued that more should be done to force banks to refinance loans rather than moving to foreclosures (Mullins, 2008) were federally insured by the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) (Schwartz, 2006) . FHA regulations require that foreclosed properties remain vacant until they are sold. Vacant houses contribute to blight, crime, and deterioration in a community and the property values in a community. Given that subprime loans were geographically concentrated (in minority communities), rather than being distributed across a city, means that whole sections of a city can become abandoned and blighted with serious declines in property values (Brescia, 2009b; Stein, 2008 change in order to ensure the health of the economic system. Assisting poor people to move into the middle class will restore economic health rather than vitiating the health of the system.
